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Which TLS and DTLS implementations are affected?

For OpenSSL, a full plaintext recovery attack is possible. All TLS and DTLS ciphersuites which include CBC-mode encryption are potentially vulnerable to our attacks. For details on the security of RC4 encryption in TLS, click here. It’s all about dropping balls, racking up “Chips,” and seeing if luck takes your game to the next level.

Wasn’t TLS in CBC-mode recently proven to be secure?

This can be further reduced to 213 sessions per byte if a byte of plaintext in one of the last two positions in a block is already known. Because of network jitter and other effects, the times observed by the attacker are noisy, and multiple samples of each time are needed to make the attacks reliable. The attacks involve detecting small differences in the time at which TLS error messages appear on the network in response to attacker-generated ciphertexts. For GnuTLS, a partial plaintext recovery attack is possible, recovering up to 4 bits of the last byte in any block of plaintext. Variant attacks may also apply to non-compliant implementations. The attacks apply to all TLS and DTLS implementations that are compliant with TLS 1.1 or 1.2, or with DTLS 1.0 or 1.2.

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  • If you have remaining questions after having read the paper, please contact us via e-mail.
  • We have expended significant research effort to develop and prototype our attacks.
  • For more details of prior attacks, see our research paper.
  • TLS in CBC-mode has been the subject of several attacks over the years, most notably padding oracle attacks and the BEAST attack.

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And, with the BEAST-style enhancements, the attacker no longer needs to know one out of two bytes of plaintext at the end of the block, so that full plaintext recovery of the full base64 encoded plaintext is possible using 213 sessions per byte. The attacks can only be carried out by a determined attacker who is located close to the machine being attacked and who can generate sufficient sessions for the attacks. They also apply to implementations of SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 that incorporate countermeasures to previous padding oracle attacks. In this context, it is notable that the leading TLS implementations are deploying countermeasures to our attacks.

This is because of a fortuitous alignment of TLS header bytes, plaintext bytes and MAC tag bytes with the block cipher’s block boundary and the hash compression function’s block boundary. At a high level, the attacks can be seen as an advanced form of padding oracle attack. In particular, the advice to implementors in the TLS RFCs concerning how to avoid padding oracle attacks does not remove all possible timing side channels. However, there are countermeasures for both of these attacks, and TLS in CBC-mode was believed to be secure once these countermeasures were applied. TLS in CBC-mode has been the subject of several attacks over the years, most notably padding oracle attacks and the BEAST attack. The sessions needed for our attacks on TLS can be generated in various ways.

We have not studied any closed-source implementations of TLS. We have examined the source code of the NSS, PolarSSL, yaSSL, BouncyCastle and OpenJDK implementations of TLS. This page is about the Lucky 13 attack on CBC-mode encryption in TLS.

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Which versions of TLS and DTLS are affected?

In addition, because of its extremely widespread use, any attack against TLS requires careful evaluation. This timing difference is detected over the network in our attack, by timing the arrival of TLS error messages. Our new research shows that this assumption is not met by TLS implementations, even when they follow the implementation advice in the TLS RFCs. The attack complexities are different for different MAC algorithms.

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The attacks arise from a flaw in the TLS specification rather than as a bug in specific implementations. We have expended significant research effort to develop and prototype our attacks. However, it is a truism that attacks only get better with time, and we cannot anticipate what improvements to our attacks, or entirely new attacks, may yet to be discovered. In this sense, the attacks do not pose a significant danger to ordinary users of TLS in their current form. OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS, yaSSL, PolarSSL, Opera, and BouncyCastle have released patches to protect TLS in CBC-mode against our attacks. We have worked closely with the IETF TLS Working Group to disclose our attacks.

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  • All TLS and DTLS ciphersuites which include CBC-mode encryption are potentially vulnerable to our attacks.
  • The attacks apply to all TLS and DTLS implementations that are compliant with TLS 1.1 or 1.2, or with DTLS 1.0 or 1.2.
  • The attack complexities are different for different MAC algorithms.
  • (Further details of these techniques can be found in our NDSS12 paper.) The attacks are fully practical for DTLS.

We disclosed the attacks to affected vendors well in advance of making our research public, and we worked with any vendor who requested our assistance in assessing the attacks and implementing countermeasures. Experience shows that the only way plinko game download to make this happen is to make the attacks as powerful as possible and build proof-of-concept implementations of them. However, the fact that the TLS MAC calculation includes 13 bytes of header information (5 bytes of TLS header plus 8 bytes of TLS sequence number) is, in part, what makes the attacks possible.

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For DTLS, the attacks can be carried out in a single session, and known amplification techniques can be used to boost the timing signals relative to the noise. In a web environment, the sessions may also be generated by client-side malware, in a similar way to the BEAST attack. The attacks cause the TLS session to be terminated, and some applications running over TLS automatically reconnect and retransmit a cookie or password. This can be reduced to 219 TLS sessions if the plaintext is known to be base64 encoded. We have discovered a variety of attacks, each having different complexity and severity.

How severe are the attacks?

So, in the context of our attacks, 13 is lucky – from the attacker’s perspective at least. Thus an attacker can distinguish messages containing at least two bytes of correct padding from all other patterns. For more details of prior attacks, see our research paper. (Further details of these techniques can be found in our NDSS12 paper.) The attacks are fully practical for DTLS.

Isn’t it irresponsible to publish attacks on such important protocols?

Unlike BEAST, no exploit is needed to bypass the same origin policy in the web browser, since the attacker does not require the ability to inject plaintext blocks into the TLS session. For TLS, our attacks are multi-session attacks, which means that we require the target plaintext to be repeatedly sent in the same position in the plaintext stream in multiple TLS sessions. There are effective countermeasures against our attacks and we have worked with a number of TLS and DTLS software developers to prepare patches and security advisories. We have found new attacks against TLS and DTLS that allow a Man-in-the-Middle attacker to recover plaintext from a TLS/DTLS connection when CBC-mode encryption is used. Please read our research paper describing the attacks and mitigations.

At this point, a variant of the standard padding oracle attack can be carried out. By repeating the attack sufficiently often and using careful statistical processing, the noise arising from network jitter and other sources can be overcome and the different padding conditions can be differentiated from one another. However, our attacks can be enhanced by combining them with BEAST-style techniques. Our attacks are based on analysing how decryption processing is carried out in TLS.